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The Dynamics of Social Capital and Conflict Management in Multiple
Resource Regimes: A Case of the Southwestern Highlands of Uganda
Pascal C. Sanginga 1, Rick N. Kamugisha 2, and Andrienne M. Martin 3
ABSTRACT. Increasingly, social capital, defined as shared norms, trust, and the horizontal and vertical
social networks that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutually beneficial collective action, is
seen as an important asset upon which people rely to manage natural resources and resolve conflicts. This
paper uses empirical data from households and community surveys and case studies, to examine the role,
strengths, and limits of social capital in managing conflicts over the use and management of natural
resources. We inventoried over 700 cases ranging from conflicts between multiple resource users to supra-
community conflicts between local communities concerns for better livelihoods and national/international
concerns for environment conservation. Results show how different types of social capital are used in
preventing and managing conflicts. Endowment in certain dimensions of social capital significantly
decreased the occurrence of conflicts and played a significant role in managing them. However, social
capital mechanisms have some limits, and are not always effective in resolving some types of conflicts.
For such conflicts, people rely on formal mechanisms for arbitration and adjudication. In many cases, these
have resulted in exclusion, coercion, and violence. Results show that policies or social capital alone do not
possess the resources needed to promote broad-based and sustainable conflict resolution strategies. Rather,
people use a range of conflict management strategies of different types and combinations of social capital
and local polices. This synergy between social capital and local policy is based on complementarity and
embededness: mutually supportive relations between local government and local communities, and the
nature and extent of the ties connecting people and communities and public institutions. Better understanding
of how this synergy between social capital and local policy can be strengthened is crucial to minimize
natural resource management conflicts.
Key Words: bylaws; conflicts; gender; highlands; natural resources management; social capital; synergy;
Uganda.
INTRODUCTION
The policy environment for natural resource
management (NRM) is changing dramatically from
centralized top-down conservation approaches, to
community-based livelihood approaches, which are
increasingly seen as offering pro-poor alternative to
resources management (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996,
Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Knox et al. 2002,
Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002, Russel and Harshbarger
2003). In Uganda, recent decentralization efforts
have reinforced pluralism in property regimes with
porous boundaries both of regimes, stakeholders,
and uses, and complex relationships among a wide
range of social actors and resource users. The
intensively cultivated and densely populated
southwestern highlands of Uganda are characterized
by fragile agroecology, with a combination of uses,
users, resources, and rules that govern resource use.
In this context, NRM can be typically described as
a “commons” (Ostrom 1990) with overlapping
combinations of porous boundaries both of regimes
and stakeholders, and when actions by individuals
or groups often generate off-site effects. In such
fragile environments, people compete for the
natural resources they need to ensure or enhance
their livelihoods. NRM is in many ways a form of
conflict management (Hendrickson 1997, Buckles
and Rusnak 1999, Castro and Nielsen 2003).
These conflicts are intensifying and if continued to
be ignored, they can escalate and result into further
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degradation of natural resources, erosion of social
and human capital, and pose significant challenges
to sustainable rural livelihoods (Hendrickson 1997,
Scott 1998, Buckles 1999, Means et al. 2002, Castro
and Nielsen 2003). Therefore, the management of
the inevitable conflicts in NRM is important as
public good, and merit policy support (Tyler 1999).
Any policy support must rely on a detailed and
systematic understanding of the nature, types,
dimensions, and implications of conflicts and their
management mechanisms. Much of the literature on
conflict management emphasizes social institutions
as mediating factors that govern the relationship
between a society or community and the natural
resources on which it depends, and therefore
emphasizes the relationship between social and
natural capital (Rasmussen et al. 1995, Orostom
1998, Upreti 1999).
Most of this research has shown the importance of
social capital foundations for sustainable
management of natural resources, successful policy
interventions, and community development
(Uphoff and Mijayaratna 2000, Woolcock and
Narayan 2000, Pretty 2003, Bridger and Luloff
2001, Grant 2001, Grootaert 2001). Its
reinforcement and continued deployment in a
society is what maintains both the existence of
particular institutions and the process of
institutional innovations within the society. The
emphasis on social capital is based on the
assumption that communities are more efficient
than state structures in the management of common-
pool resource conflicts. However, although
literature on social capital has emerged in the last
decades, there is still limited empirical information
on the role of the different dimensions of social
capital in managing conflicts. The central
hypothesis of this paper is that presence of social
capital is a necessary precondition for the
management of NRM conflicts, and for sustainable
management and use of common pool resources at
the local level. This paper examines the different
types of conflicts over the use and management of
natural resources, and determines the role,
strengths, and limits of social capital in managing
NRM conflicts. The rest of this paper starts with the
description of status of natural resources in Kabale
and their different property regimes. Then, we
examine the prevalence and the different types of
conflicts over the use and management of natural
resources. The sections that follow examine the role,
strengths, and limits of social capital mechanisms
for managing conflicts. The concluding section
suggests a framework for strengthening synergy
between social capital and policy, and building local
capacity for alternative conflict management.
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
REGIMES IN THE HIGHLANDS OF
KABALE, UGANDA
The study was conducted in Kabale district in the
southwestern highlands of Uganda. Kabale district
has an estimated population of 461,785. Population
density exceeds 350 inhabitants/km² in several
areas, making Kabale one of the highest densely
populated rural districts in Uganda. Population
pressure has continued to increase resulting in
fragmented small farms, i.e., 0.25–1.0 ha for an
average family of six, and steep cultivated slopes
(1500–2700 masl). Several scholars have
extensively documented the status of natural
resources management (NRM) and technologies for
reversing land degradation in the highlands of
Kabale. For a summary of studies see Tukahirwa
(1997), and Raussen et al. (2002) for inventory of
technologies. The status of agricultural-based NRM
in the highlands of Kabale cannot be better
summarized than with this explanation by an elderly
farmer, Zaburooni, now in his late 70s, who came
to the village in 1944 when he was about 18 years
old:
This area was not occupied before the
1940s. The first people settled on the
hilltop, as there were forests and jungles
lower down. There were about seven
families present at that time. They built
houses on the top and cultivated around the
houses. ...When more people came to the
area, the clan leaders would allocate enough
land that could support a family, depending
on the family size. They did not think about
the future or acquire huge chunks of land
ready for expansion. ...In the past you could
stand on a hilltop and only see another
hilltop because of the dense and tall bushes
in the valley. Everything was just trees; all
the valleys and slopes were also covered
with forest. (...) Cultivation started at the
mid slopes, moving down to the lower
slopes, in order to scare away predators
(wild pigs, leopards and lions). (...). The
east-facing slope was the first to be
cultivated, starting from the mid slope to
the valley, then expanding south on the
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eastern slope. (...) We used to plant plots in
alternate years (3 to 5 yr, even more) to
regain its fertility. When you leave a plot to
rest, grasses grow up and later rot and the
soil gains its fertility (...). The hills top and
valley bottoms were used as grazing lands
for everybody. Now because many people
came into the village and with constant
tilling without resting the land, people are
now forced to cultivate both the valley
bottoms and the hilltops. Some rich and
powerful people have also bought the fertile
parts of the valley bottoms for their exotic
dairy cows. Some used their power to grab
communal grazing land, like the whole of
that hill...The Government also is stopping
people from using the wetlands and
swamps, where we used to fish and collect
papyrus and building material. Now people
are arrested for collecting papyrus from the
swamps, or firewood from a village
woodlot...This is very difficult for the poor
and old people like me who don’t have
money. When we came to this village,
money was not the issue, and there were
plenty of resources for the village. Now we
have so many disputes over the use and
property of land, even for grazing land and
other communal properties. People are now
competing for everything (...)
Historically, NRM regimes were often regulated
through customary and traditional institutions and
dispute resolution mechanisms. These institutions
still operate through clans and other farmers local
associations. Clans play an important role as an
important feature of social organization that
facilitates coordination, cooperation, and for
managing the social structures and institutions for
NRM (Place et al. 2001). Though local communities
have long been known to manage their NRM
effectively over a long period, many common- pool
resources have now come under the jurisdiction of
the state, turning some into protected areas, and
restricting the use of many others with strict policies.
Even in the case of private property regimes,
individual farmers are not entirely free to decide for
themselves how to make use of natural resources,
but participate in a process of collective choice that
sets rules and regulations, or bylaws for individual
and collective use.
The penetration of the State was accompanied by
the breakdown of traditional practices and the
emergence of strict regulations or policies based on
the traditional conception that common-pool
resources (CPR) need protection from the
destructive actions of people and local
communities. The authority for resource use has
been invested in government institutions by the
colonial legacy. Most of the initial laws in Uganda,
as in most parts of Africa, were not drafted in the
interests of the communities that lived near these
resources. After the independence in 1962,
government policies have concentrated on their
conservation mandate for the protected areas,
paying little attention to the legitimacy of the needs
and rights of local communities, but implementing
policies imposed by international conservation
treaties and conventions.
For decades there has been systematic failure to
recognize that traditional institutions and local
knowledge has been the basis of the survival of most
rural communities. However, over the last decade,
the decentralization of government and environmental
management, various government policies, and
institutions recognize the right of communities to
participate in environmental management, and
recognize that local communities can manage
common pool resources in an effective and
sustainable manner. The mechanisms of decentralization
are established and functioning, with the structure
of a five-tier system of local councils and local
government structures (Table 1), a bottom-up
planning process, and powers to collect and disburse
local revenue, develop and implement bylaws and
local policies for land use, environmental
management, and agricultural production (Sanginga
et al. 2004). At the base of the local government
structure, the local council or LC1, A village of
about 50–100 households, consists of all adults
residing in a particular village who elect a nine-
member village local council executive committee.
Beyond the village or LC1, in ascending
geographical size, there are parishes (LC2),
subcounty or gombolola (LC3), county (LC4), and
district (LC5) councils. The subcounty level (LC3)
is the basic unit of local government, both political
and administrative. The district (LC5) is the highest
level of local government and links with central
government. The provision of local government
elections guarantee widespread representation at the
various councils and include quotas by gender,
people with disabilities, and youths. For example,
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at least one-third of the council members must be
women, an affirmative action to empower women
and promote gender equity.
In this paper, we use the term policy in its broad
sense to refer to laws, rules, and regulations and
their implementation resulting from public, state, or
collective decision making (Thomson 2001, Means
et al. 2002). Policies can be generated and operate
at different levels: international, national, regional,
district, and local levels. In this study, we are
particularly concerned with those local-level
policies and community regulations usually referred
to as bylaws. Bylaws are rules made by lower local
government councils (LC1 and LC3) and provide
the local policy guidelines to be followed in sectoral
developments, such as agriculture and natural
resource management. These bylaws or local
arrangements for natural resource management are
now receiving greater attention as a viable
alternative for enforcing government policies and
rectifying their inefficiencies in agriculture and
NRM (Sanginga et al. 2004).
In a social capital framework, these local policies
or bylaws can be defined as negotiated rules, social
norms, and agreed behaviors that exist within
communities to prevent and manage conflicts.
Colleman (1988) identified different forms of social
capital: obligations and expectations, informal
channels, and social norms. Fukuyama (1999) and
Bowles and Gintis (2002) regard social capital as
an instantiated set of informal values or norms
shared among members of a group that permits to
cooperate with one another. It is the willingness to
live by the norms of one’s community and to punish
those who do not. In the context of this study, bylaws
are rules made by lower local decentralized councils
and local communities and provide viable
alternative for enforcing government policies and
rectifying their inefficiencies in agriculture and
NRM.
TYPES AND DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICTS
OVER THE USE AND MANAGEMENT OF
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES
We define conflicts as situations involving people
or social groups with different interests, and
mutually antagonist tendencies and opposing
influences competing for the use of limited
resources to ensure or enhance their livelihoods
(Mitchell 1981 in ACTS 1999, Means et al. 2002).
Their manifestations, dimensions, and level of
intensity vary greatly. They can be implicit or
explicit, proximate, local, regional, national, or
international, latent or violent. Following Ramirez
(1999) and Means et al. (2002), the analysis of
conflicts began with identifying and describing the
conflict, its boundaries and interrelationships, the
origins, levels, issues, and stakeholders. To
encourage people to speak about and see conflicts
as part of human interactions, we asked:
“From working in other areas, we have seen that
problems and disputes over the use of natural
resources, e.g., land, crops, trees, livestock,
wetlands, forests, can be common among people in
the same area. Would you give use some examples
of such problems and disputes in your areas? Please
tell us what was the problem, who was involved?
What were the reasons? How have the people tried
to address the conflict? How were problems
resolved? What was accomplished? What were the
consequences or damages caused?”
We interviewed 203 farmers in 16 villages and
found that almost all the farmers have been involved
in conflict over the use and management of natural
resources in one way or another. About 43% of
farmers have experienced at least one to three
conflicts, whereas the majority (55.6%) has
experienced more than three conflicts. One out of
each five households has experienced more than
seven conflicts (Table 1). There was however no
significant difference in the number of conflicts
reported by men and women (t value = -0.327). The
survey inventoried 701 conflict cases. These
conflicts are multifaceted, multidimensional, and
multiscale, involving a variety of stakeholders and
resource users ranging from intrahousehold and
suprahousehold gender relations, property rights
disputes to antagonist, distrustful relationships, and
violent clashes amongst and between farmers, local
communities, government, and external institutions
(Table 2).
These conflicts can however be grouped into three
broad categories: community-level conflicts
opposing farmers within same communities;
intercommunity conflicts opposing different
communities or farmers from neighboring villages,
and supracommunity conflicts opposing farmers
and communities with higher-level formal
institutions or individuals. The most common type
of intracommunity-level conflicts concerned
hillside management, causing destruction of terrace
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Table 1. Levels and main functions of decentralised local government structures in Uganda.
 
Local Government l Level Composition Functions
Local Council 1: Village
(composed of more or less 50
households
9 members, at least 4 women Assist in maintaining law, order and security
 
Initiate, support and participate in self help projects
 
Recommend persons for local defence units
 
Serves as communication channels with government
services
 
Monitor the administration of projectsImpose service
feesCollect taxes
 
Resolve problems and disputes Make bylaws
LC 2: Parish (composed of
3-10 villages)
Depending on the number of
villages elected from the
village at least 4 women
Assist in maintaining law, order and security
 
Serves as communication channels with government
services
 
Initiate, support and participate in self help projects
 
Monitor the administration of projects
 
Resolve problems and disputes
LC 3: Sub-county (Composed
of 2-10 parishes)















Levy, charge, and collect fees and taxes
 
Monitor performance of government employees
 
Formulate, approve and execute sub-county budgets
 
Resolve problems and disputes
LC 4: County (composed of
3-5 sub-counties)
5, chairpersons or vice-
chairperson from each
subcounty
Advise district officers and area members of Parliament
 
Resolve problems and disputes
 
Monitor delivery of services
(con'd)
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2 people with disabilities
 
19 elected councillors




Ensure implementation of government policies and
compliance with it
 
Plan for the District
 
Enact district laws and ordinances
 
Monitor performance of government policies
 
Levy, charge and collect fees and taxes
 
Formulate, approve and execute district budgets
 Source: Sanginga et al (2004)
 
bunds and boundary disputes, which affect over
70% of households. This type of conflict is fuelled
by the excessive fragmentation of very small
agricultural land, and the high competition over the
use of farmland. This increasing competition has
also created different types of conflicts related to
property rights (43.9%), from competing
inheritance claims, illegal sale of land, land
grabbing, and other issues of resource ownership
and access, destruction of terraces, cutting of trees
and theft of resources. More than 74% of households
were affected by conflicts arising from animals
grazing on field crops. This type of conflict is more
pronounced shortly after the planting season when
livestock graze on young plants and trees. Most
communal grazing lands have been turned into
individual properties and farmland, leaving people
with livestock with limited resources for grazing
their animals. Other forms of conflicts included
bush burning (40%), cutting of trees (43%), and
theft of crops, livestock, and farm implements
(45%).
Competing rights and claims often caused
intercommunity conflicts over common pool
resources, e.g., wetlands, grazing lands, woodlots,
and paths, theft of resources, as well as bush
burning. Bush burning often started by herd boys or
by farmers as a land preparation practice has caused
several conflicts within and among communities,
especially during the dry season. In many cases,
such fires have been difficult to control and have
destroyed property, sometimes even burning
houses. In some cases, the competing claims over
common-pool resources (CPR) have resulted in
violent clashes among farmers and among
communities as illustrated in this case:
Farmers from these three neighboring villages used
to graze their animals communally on one hill and
valley bottom in this village. However, these
grazing lands deteriorated quickly and could not
sustain all the animals that kept on increasing in
numbers. The village council met and decided to
restrict grazing lands to residents of this village.
Farmers from the other two villages did not comply,
and this has always resulted in violent clashes and
endless disputes. Efforts to resolve this conflict have
involved community leaders, local council (LC1)
members of the three villages, and even the sub-
county authorities, but these clashes continue every
dry season, and people have lost animals and
property.
There has also been escalation of different types of




 Conflicts over protected areas and parks that
oppose local community concerns for
livelihoods and national and international
concerns for environment and biodiversity
conservation. Most of these conflicts were
confined to areas around the Bwindi
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Table 2. Percentage distributions of farmers by number of natural resources management conflicts reported
(%).
 
Number of conflicts reported Men Women Total
No conflict reported 01.4 01.4 01.4
1-3 conflicts 43.5 42.5 43.0
4-6 conflicts 31.9 31.5 31.7
7-10 conflicts 20.3 19.2 19.7
More than 10 conflicts 02.9 05.5 04.2
Impenetrable National Park, and opposed
park authorities to communities living around
the park. These were of two particular forms:
crops that destroy wildlife and property, and
people’s encroachment on park resources.
Crop raiding by wildlife was reported as a
major form of conflict contributing to the
hostility between local communities and the
park authority. These animals, especially
baboons and bush pigs, usually leave the park
and destroy crops planted by farmers
surrounding the park. These types of conflicts
affect over 70% of farm households with
farmland bordering the park in Ikumba,
causing considerable crop losses.
 
l
 Encroachment on wetlands, forests, and
protected areas. Although government
agencies involving international actors
restrict the use of such resources, e.g.,
wetlands, woodlots, forests, and associated
resources, local communities consider them
as common-pool resources with many
opportunities for their livelihoods.
 
l
 Conflicts between different government
policies and agencies over authority to
regulate natural resource management, e.g.,
district agricultural office, environment,
forest, and health departments. These
conflicts are often caused by uncoordinated
sectoral policies and regulations.
 
l
 Conflicts among local communities and
elites, e.g., government authorities, NGOs,
rich farmers, over grabbing and eviction from
lands, privatization and expropriation of
CPRs, trespassing on private property.
 
The most common type of conflict opposed local
communities to the Bwindi Impenetrable National
Park (BINP) in Ikumba subcounty. Previously
designed as a forest reserve with relatively liberal
and rarely reinforced regulations regarding access
rights, Bwindi was accorded high protection status
in 1991 as a national park and designated a World
heritage site since 1994, and was renamed Bwindi
Impenetrable National Park. This had immediate
effect of closing all access to the forest products by
adjacent communities, resulting in huge amounts of
conflicts and resentment (Bloomley 2003). The park
is surrounded by sloping terrain supporting one of
the highest population densities in Uganda.
THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Over the last decade, the concept of social capital
has risen dramatically to become one of the most
fertile concepts in social science literature
(Bourdieu 1983, Portes 1985,1998, Colleman 1988,
Putman 1993, Uphoff and Mijayaratna 2000,
Woolcock and Narayan 2000, Durlauf 2002,
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Gillinson 2004). Some of pioneering scholars of
social capital such as Bourdieu (1983, 1985),
Colleman (1988) and Putman (1993) considered
social capital as a resource for action, which is
developed and accessed through membership in
formal organizations, Putman defined social capital
as the features of social organizations such as social
networks, social interactions, norms, social trust,
and reciprocity, cooperation that facilitate
coordination and cooperation and that enable people
to act collectively for mutual benefits (Woolcock
and Narayan 2000).
More recent formulations and studies using the
concept of social capital build on these principles.
Uphoff and Mijayaratna (2000) distinguish between
structural and cognitive forms of social capital,
refining the notions of shared norms and trust at
individual and household levels, and the horizontal
and vertical social networks constituting social
capital. They define structural social capital as
referring to the networks, linkages and practices
within and between communities, including
membership in formal and informal associations,
participation in decision making and the forms of
social organzation within which networks of
relationships are located. In contrast, cognitive
social capital refers to the attitudes, values, beliefs,
social norms, and behaviors that exist within a
community (Uphoff and Mijayaratna 2000, Grant
2001).
The two dimensions relate to a further refinement
of the concept of social capital into “bonding,”
“bridging,” and “linking” social capital (Pretty
2003). Pretty describes bonding social capital as the
social cohesion within groups or communities
resulting from relationships between people of
similar ethnicity, social status and location, based
on local ties, trust and shared moral values,
reinforced by working together. Bridging social
capital refers to the structural relationships and
networks which cross social groupings, involving
coordination or collaboration with other groups,
external associations, mechanisms of social support
or information sharing across communities and
groups (Narayan and Pritchett 1999). Linking social
capital crosses describes the ability of groups to
engage with external agencies, either to draw on
useful resources or to influence policies (Pretty
2003). Linking social capital crosses status, linking
poor people and those in positions of influence.
The different aspects and dimensions of social
capital determine whether a community can act as
a cohesive unit, i.e., bonding, whether people
comply with the norms and bylaws, i.e., structural;
whether they have links with other community
organizations, i.e., bridging, or whether they can
access and influence institutions with more power
and resources, i.e., linking, for managing natural
resources, including conflicts. Results of this study
show that farmers use several social capital
mechanisms for managing conflicts. Although the
specific mechanisms for managing conflicts vary
with the conflict type, nature, levels, and
stakeholders or actors involved, we found that
people generally rely on five general mechanisms
to manage conflicts: avoidance, negotiation, and
mediation, arbitration, adjudication, and coercion.
In many situations however, there is a combination
of different resolution mechanisms, some time in
synergy or sequence, but sometimes in
contradiction and conflicts. These mechanisms
correspond to and are activated by different types
of social capital.
One of the traditional institutions for managing
conflicts is the clan. Traditionally, the basic social
organization of the Bakiga people of Kabale uses
the agnatic lineage structure based on principle of
patrilineal descent, which forms the core of social
structures and permeates practically every aspect of
life. There are several clans in each village, although
two or three may be dominant. For example, in
Karambo village, there are two dominant clans:
Abagyeri and Abarihira, and four minor clans,
Abaheesi, Abanyangabo, Abasigi and Abakongoro.
In Kagyera, clans in order of size are the Abayondo,
Abagunga, Abakongwe, Abaheesi, and Abasigi. 
Relationships between clansmen cut across
neighborhoods. We found that 34% of conflict cases
between farmers are handled by clan elders and
community members who facilitated negotiation
between conflicting parties to reach a mutually
agreed decision. From the interviews, it was often
reported that:
... There have not been serious (violent)
conflicts in the village in the last 15 yr.
Simple cases of disagreement with
neighbors are solved locally by the elders.
Misunderstandings between two people are
taken to clan leaders who call four to six
people as witnesses, to mediate the case and
reach a decision. Usually what is decided is
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respected. If not, the cases are referred to
the local councils (LCs) for arbitration.
Avoidance was often used when the conflict is
trivial or of passing importance. The desire to avoid
confrontation outweighs the need to bring conflicts
into public domain. Interviews with a male farmer
better capture such cases:
This woman... has been planting her
sorghum in my farm without my permission
for two seasons. The first time I allowed her
to harvest her sorghum. The following
season she went back and planted beans and
now she is planting sorghum again. I have
asked her to find another place to farm but
she has refused. She is a widow and has no
one to help her. If I take the case to the LC1,
they will decide against her. I am just being
patient hoping the woman may reform but
she is not reforming. Maybe I will now take
the case to the LC1 if she continues for six
months. But I will see...
However, in a considerable number of cases (30%),
bonding social capital mechanisms, e.g., clan
leaders, neighbors, relatives, village members, are
perceived as having lower capacity for resolving
conflicts, as most cases taken to them are often
unresolved and often require intervention of other
institutions for arbitration (Table 2). The main factor
of this distrust is lack of power to improve sanctions.
There is nothing clan elders and relatives can do to
ensure that those who break the rules are punished.
A combination of social, economic, and political
factors has undermined the ability of local
mechanisms, clan elders and community organizations
to manage conflicts (Means et al. 2002). Also the
more educated and wealthier farmers are not willing
to accept decisions by local communities and clan
elders and prefer to take their cases to government
institutions at higher levels for arbitration rather
than mediation and negotiation within the village.
Other problems included biases, corruption and
laxity of clan leaders. Although there are no
financial costs associated with local mechanisms for
resolving conflicts, a considerable number of
farmers perceived local mechanisms as being
biased. This perception was particularly significant
for women compared to men, corroborating
women’s perceptions that local mechanisms are
biased against them. Indeed most conflict cases
involving women, or opposing women to their
husbands’ relatives are seldom resolved in women’s
favor, as illustrated by this woman’s case:
When my husband died, my brothers-in-
law wanted to take our land and cows
because I had five daughters and only one
small boy. I pleaded with them that I needed
the property to raise the children. They were
only interested in the land, but not the
welfare of their bothers’ children. I
appealed to the clan elders, but they were
in favor of their relatives (my brothers-in-
law). My own relatives, neighbors and
friends also tried to mediate, but the clan
elders still decided to give the land to my
brothers-in-law. Then I had no choice but
take the case to the village local council
(LC1). The LC1 leaders knew the
background of the case as many of them
were already involved in mediation and
reconciliation attempts. They ruled in my
favor, allowing me to continue using the
land until my son becomes an adult to
decide. But they also decided that I couldn’t
dispose of this land, or rent it, or exchange
it with a more fertile land near the house.
My brothers-in-law are not happy and they
don’t talk to or visit us.
In some other cases, conflicts between clan
members or with other farmers emerged and
become increasingly public, developing gradually
and or rapidly because of a few significant events.
In such cases, the capacities of clan leaders to
resolve conflict become inappropriate, and
conflicting parties take their cases to other social
structures within the community. We also found that
farmers’ groups, and particularly women’s groups
have relatively high capacity to resolve conflicts and
most cases are resolved through mediation and
negotiation. Farmers’ groups usually have high
levels of structural social capital, e.g., trust and
cooperation, norms and rules within groups, as well
as bridging social capital, i.e., capacity of groups
making links with other groups, and linking with
the LC system. Since a considerable proportion of
farmers belong to several groups, such groups have
the advantage of facilitating mediation and
negotiation, a voluntary process in which conflict
parties meet to reach mutually acceptable decisions,
and seek to seek to create a win-win outcome.
However, this is most effective when conflicts
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Table 2. Percentage distributions of farmers by number of natural resources management conflicts reported
(%).
 
Number of conflicts reported Men Women Total
No conflict reported 01.4 01.4 01.4
1-3 conflicts 43.5 42.5 43.0
4-6 conflicts 31.9 31.5 31.7
7-10 conflicts 20.3 19.2 19.7
More than 10 conflicts 02.9 05.5 04.2
oppose people belonging to the same group. For
example, in Habugarama village, i.e., about 55
households, we identified about 10 local groups and
organizations ranging from labor parties, credit and
savings groups, pig rearing, farming groups, swamp
association, to “Determined women,” a drumming
and singing group, mothers’ unions, church-based
groups, etc. This high density of local organizations
suggests a relatively high level of social capital with
a stronger capacity for managing conflicts.
However, although some communities have long
been known to manage their natural resources
conflicts effectively, recent years have seen the
emergence of strict regulations or policies for
sustainable management of natural resources. The
decentralization process has established the local
councils at village levels who concentrate both
political and administrative powers to manage
community life, including arbitrating disputes,
making byelaws and enforcing government
policies. A considerable number of farmers believed
that a strong enforcement mechanism is the only
way to prevent and resolve conflicts: “ABakiga
nibategyekwa kifuba” The Bakiga people are
stubborn. Many conflicts were resolved through
arbitration, taking the case to lower levels of local
government, LC1, who facilitate negotiation
between parties and renders a decision. The LC1
has power to impose decisions and sanctions on the
people (Table 3).
Results show that many of the NRM bylaws were
perceived as being effective in preventing and
resolving conflicts. About 40% of conflict cases
were resolved through arbitration by local
government village council members who are
empowered by the Local Government Act to resolve
disputes and conflicts. There are also some cases of
conflicts, which were resolved through adjudication.
We inventoried about 79 land related conflicts
involving a variety of stakeholders. These involved
conflicting and overlapping claims over land,
including inheritance rights, land grabbing, and
criminal trespass. The main outcomes of
adjudication have been imposing fines (67.8%) to
the offenders, and imprisonment of offenders, i.e.,
10 cases. Results concur with the observations of
Means et al. (2002) that the court mechanisms are
intimidating and inaccessible to the majority of
farmers, especially women and the poor, who are
often uneducated and live far from the magistrate
courts at the subcounty and district headquarters.
The judicial language and administrative
procedures used in these courts are also alien to
farmers. The time to resolve conflicts, administrative
procedures, and other socioeconomic and political
barriers also prevent farmers from resolving their
conflicts using this channel (Table 4).
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Table 3. Relative importance of conflict resolution mechanisms.
 
Resolution mechanisms Percent of responses
(N=667)
Avoidance:
People don’t report problems, they try to solve them
34.8
Mediation and Negotiation:
People usually rely on clan elders, relatives, neighbors and groups to solve conflicts
29.3
Arbitration:
People report problems to local government leaders (village council)
39.9
Adjudication:
People take problems to courts or are coerced to comply
2.5
THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
One important finding from this study is that social
capital mechanisms were not effective for managing
conflicts between local communities and external
powerful stakeholders. There are some disadvantages
and limitations of different conflict management
mechanisms (Table 5) In most conflict cases
opposing local communities to park authorities and
to government structures, the use of force and
coercion including harassment, physical assault,
intimidation, fines and imprisonment, was most
common. Several cases and narratives confirm that
the park authorities impose heavy fines for any
encroachment on the park resources.
On the other hand, although farmers have reported
such conflicts to local councils (LCs), they are often
left unresolved. In many cases the park authorities
used coercion as a mechanism to resolve conflicts,
imposing their will through the use of force, exerting
unequal power relation. The conflict is exacerbated
by the lack of clear mechanisms of compensation
and conflict resolution. There are unclear provisions
in the Wildlife Statue and Local Government Act
and uncertainties over who should deal with such
conflicts as well as reluctance from Park authorities
to consider the option of culling the animals. As a
result of their frustrations and anger, farmers have
also resorted to some forms of violence like setting
fires to the park. Interviews with key informants
confirmed Bloomley’s report that about sixteen fires
were started in and around the park by local residents
with deliberate intent of destroying the park
(Bloomley, 2003). The closure of the park to
surrounding communities immediately resulted in
violent escalation of conflicts between local
communities and park staff.
In such supra-community conflict situations, the
extent of linking social capital, that is the vertical
relations between organizations, institutions, and
communities and links with external and formal
organizations, should become important in
resolving conflicts. Kabale is arguably one of the
districts where there is a high concentration of
research and development organizations working
on various dimensions of common-pool resources
(CPR) and natural resource management (NRM)
issues. For example, villages in Ikumba appeared to
be well covered by external organizations (94%)
followed by Rubaya (81%) and Bubare (57%). The
high concentration of development organizations in
Kabale is mainly related to increasing concerns of
environment conservation and protection of natural
parks and forest reserves. Some of the international
organizations have been facilitating community
conservation initiatives, including conflict management.
Bloomley (2003) provides an account of CARE-
Development Through Conservation (DTC) project
attempts to manage park conflicts through
mediation and negotiation between local development
interests of resource poor households and the
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Table 4. Capacity of actors and stakeholders to resolve conflicts.
Capacity of actors and stakeholders to manage conflicts
Low* Medium** High*** Not involved, can’t
tell
Actors and Stakeholders
Clan elders 31.1 12.4 56.6 -
Neighbours 29.9 15.3 51.8 -
Relatives 26.1 12.3 61.0 -
Church leaders 8.6 10.7 75.8 5.0
Farmer groups 13.3 8.4 64.1 4.2
Women groups 17.0 7.0 70.4 5.6
Village Local Council (LC1) 8.2 13.7 78.1 -
Local Council II (LC2
parish)
22.6 30.2 43.8 3.5
Local Council III (Sub
county courts)
13.9 15.3 61.1 9.5
District court 7.2 7.9 61.2 23.7
*Low, conflict cases taken to them are often unresolved
**Medium, some conflict cases are resolved but not always
***High, most cases are resolved
national and international interests of environment
and biodiversity conservation. Although there have
been some cases of successful arbitration and
negotiation, the unequal power relation between the
local communities and national and international
stakeholders has often meant that conflicts are
resolved through coercion. He found that there is an
inequitable sharing of conservation costs and
benefits between different stakeholders. Conservation
costs are borne by marginalized poor households
adjacent to the park, whereas the benefits are
enjoyed by wealthier tourists in the global
community and national and international level
stakeholders. Also, a revenue sharing scheme
between the park and local communities remains an
issue of conflicts, in particular contested by local
government. Revenue sharing scheme between the
park and local communities remains an issue of
conflict, in particular contested by local
government.
We also found that in many cases, the adjudication
process combined different mechanisms of conflict
resolution in a complex fashion, and involved
different actors at different levels. Some conflicts
taken to the higher levels are referred back to the
LC1 for more effective resolution mechanisms. In
a significant number of cases, we found a positive
synergy between social capital and local policy
institutions or administrative procedures for
resolving conflicts, as illustrated by James’ case, a
male farmer in Rubaya:
James had a problem with his brother who
was trying to use force to grab land from
him on the basis that he was the eldest son
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Table 5. Strengths and limitations of different conflict management mechanisms.
 
Conflict management systems Strengths Limitations
Social capital mechanisms Encourages participation by community
members and respect of local values and
customs
 
Provides familiarity of past experience
 
Can be more accessible because of low
cost, use of local language, flexibility in
scheduling
 
Decision-making is often based on
collaboration, with consensus emerging
from wide-ranging discussions, often
fostering local reconciliation
 
Contributes to a process of community self
reliance and empowerment
Not all people have equal access to
customary conflict management practices
owning to gender, class, caste, ethnic or
other discrimination
 
Courts and administrative law have
supplanted authorities that lack legal
recognition
 
Communities are becoming more mixed,
resulting in weakened authority and social
relationships
 
Often cannot accommodate conflicts among
different communities, or between





Officially established with supposedly
well-defined procedures
 
Takes national interests, concerns and
issues into consideration
 
Decisions are legally binding.
Often inaccessible to the poor, women,
marginalized groups and remote
communities because of the cost, distance,
language barriers, illiteracy and political
discrimination
 
Judicial and technical specialists often lack





Promotes conflict management and
resolution by building on shared interests
and finding points of agreement
 
Processes resemble those already existing
in many conflict management systems
 
Low cost and flexible
 
Fosters a sense of ownership in the
solution and its process of implementation
 
Emphasizes building capacity within
communities so local people become more
effective facilitators and handlers of
conflict.
May encounter difficulties in getting all
stakeholders to the bargaining table
 
May not be able to overcome power
differences among stakeholders in that some
groups remain marginalized
 
Decisions may not always be legally binding
 
Some practitioners may try to use methods
developed in other countries without
adapting them to the local contexts
Source: Adapted from Means et al (2003)
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and had worked on the land with their
father. They went to the elders who found
the brother guilty, but the brother did not
accept the verdict and decided to go to the
Grade two magistrates. The magistrate
referred the case back to the LC1 and village
leaders. The LC1 and village leaders still
ruled in favor of James. The brother was not
satisfied and decided to take the case to the
district court in Kabale where he could use
money to win the case. He then sold that
land. Subsequently he suffered some
misfortunes and suspected his brother had
bewitched him. He finally came back to the
clan elders and village leaders to ask for
reconciliation with James. He was fined and
forced to give another piece of land to
James...
CONCLUSION
The results of the study showed that a range of
conflict minimizing strategies flow from different
types and combinations of social capital and local
polices. There is evidence that farmers and
communities use a plurality of strategies, processes
and avenues to resolve conflicts, and create checks
and balances that a single conflict management
system cannot generate. Social capital mechanisms
have certainly a number of strengths and have been
effective in a number of cases. For example,
bridging and structural social capital as expressed
in the density of farmers’ groups, and particularly
women’s groups, have a relatively higher capacity
to resolve conflicts as most cases are resolved
through mediation and negotiation within these
groups.
The study also shows that social capital mechanisms
have some limits, and were not always effective in
resolving certain types of conflicts. This is not
surprising with respect to bonding social capital,
given the characteristics of this capital. In fact,
bonding social capital can be coercive and often
leads to homophily (Newman and Dale 2005). Thus,
there is a need for bridging and linking social capital
as well as policy interventions. Many conflicts were
resolved through arbitration and adjudication at
different levels of local government. The village
local council (LC1), which is the lower level of
decentralization, was perceived as the most
effective in resolving conflicts. Conflicts taken to
the LC1 are usually resolved through arbitration and
mediation, involving other community leaders.
However, this confidence decreased significantly as
one moves higher up the ladder to the LC2 and LC3,
which are more remote and distant to community
social relations. At these levels, adjudication and
coercion are generally used, and many farmers
perceived the process as being biased and not
equitable. There is substitution and exclusion of
social capital mechanisms by policy structures.
Many of these formal conflict resolution
mechanisms often have a high social cost for local
communities, especially to women and other
vulnerable groups, who end up taking the burden of
paying fines and other forms of social exclusion and
coercion. Often, low levels of linking social capital
and dysfunctional policies led to rampant conflicts.
In many cases, there was substitution and exclusion
of social capital mechanisms by formal
administrative and political structures.
Results show that policies or social capital alone do
not possess the resources needed to promote broad-
based and sustainable conflict resolution strategies.
Rather, when local policies and social capital were
combined in a positive sum way, as in the case of
LC system, conflicts were likely to be minimized.
We therefore suggest the "synergy approach" of
social capital (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) and
local policy for managing conflicts. The synergy
between local policies and social capital is based on
complementarity and embededness. Complementarity
refers to mutually supportive relations between
public and private actors, local government, and
local communities and is exemplified in the
decentralization framework that links state
institutions to local communities in Uganda.
Embededness refers to the nature and extent of the
ties connecting people and communities and public
institutions. With recent decentralization efforts in
Uganda, the village local council is embedded in
social relations and hence may be under pressure by
the community to perform and be responsive to
them. The LC is also seen as complementary to
traditional mechanisms for resolving conflicts. In
the same vein, farmers groups and clan elders have
been assisting the LC1 in arbitration and mediation
of conflicts. However, this synergy may only work
where there are high levels of social capital and well
functioning government policies that are coherent
and credible. Where there are high levels of social
capital, communities have the ability to develop
coping mechanisms to deal with conflicts.
Conversely, as shown in the cases of supra-
community conflicts, where there are low levels of
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linking social capital and dysfunctional policies,
conflicts tend to become of high intensity and
violent. Exclusion, coercion and violence are the
mechanisms used to manage such conflicts.
Better understanding of how synergy between social
capital and local policy can be strengthened is
crucial to promote alternative conflict management
mechanisms. Formal policy and informal social
capital mechanisms work best when, through
redistributive, integrative and capacity building
measures, they strengthen the capabilities of
stakeholders to enter into voluntary negotiation and
mutually beneficial collective action to resolve
conflicts. The tasks of research should therefore be
to determine how the positive manifestations of
social capital, e.g., cooperation, trust, norms, and
institutional efficiency, can enhance the formulation
and implementation of bylaws and rectify
dysfunctional policies, and how local policies can
strengthen community mechanisms for conflict
prevention and resolution. Promoting a positive
synergy between social capital and policy requires
participatory social learning processes and more
integrative policy processes that strengthen and
build social and human capital to transform NRM
conflicts into opportunities for mutually beneficial
collective action for sustainable livelihoods. As
noted by Evans 1996 and Tendler 1997 (In
Molyneux 2002), successfully participatory
projects have frequently depended upon a creative
synergy between state policy and civil society.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art6/responses/
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